Brexit and the Conservative Party by Hayton, R
This is a repository copy of Brexit and the Conservative Party.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/128533/
Version: Accepted Version
Book Section:
Hayton, R orcid.org/0000-0002-9899-0035 (2018) Brexit and the Conservative Party. In: 
Diamond, P, Nedergaard, P and Rosamond, B, (eds.) Routledge Handbook of the Politics 
of Brexit. Routledge International Handbooks . Routledge , London, UK , pp. 157-166. 
ISBN 9781138049369 
© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard and Ben 
Rosamond; individual chapters, the contributors. This is an author produced version of a 
book chapter published in The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit . Uploaded in 
accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
This is a pre-publication version of chapter accepted for publication in The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit, 
edited by Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard, and Ben Rosamond; published by Routledge in 2018 (pp. 157-166). 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 13 
BREXIT AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY  
 
Richard Hayton 
 
Introduction 
The vote for Brexit poses a fundamental challenge to Conservative statecraft, the most profound the 
party has faced since Edward HeathÕs administration secured entry to the EEC in 1973. The 
referendum result was the central failure of David CameronÕs premiership, prompting his 
immediate resignation. It exposed the limitations of his efforts to modernise his party (Kerr and 
Hayton 2015), but also reflected deeper tensions that have animated Conservative politics 
throughout the democratic era. This chapter analyses these utilising Andrew GambleÕs (1974) 
conceptual framework of the politics of power and the politics of support. In his seminal text, The 
Conservative Nation, Gamble argued that the Conservatives have traditionally sought to balance the 
demands of electoral politics with a desire to uphold the prevailing politics of power (through which 
the state reflects the interests of capital). The need to cultivate a politics of support that does not 
challenge the fundamentals of the economic system explains the ÔConservative wish to base their 
appeal to the electorate on a national rather than a class perspectiveÕ, most famously articulated 
through the language of ÔOne NationÕ conservatism (ibid.: 18). It also helps account for the historic 
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reputation of the party as one willing to compromise in order to secure power, and its self-image as 
a party of practical government rather than ideology. Managing the process of leaving the European 
Union raises the possibility of a major conflict between the politics of power and the politics of 
support. If the party leadership can navigate a way through this hostile terrain Brexit may be 
recorded by history as an exemplar of Conservative statecraft. However, the process is unlikely to 
be a smooth one, and threatens to destabilise British politics and cause ructions in the Conservative 
Party for years to come.  
 
This chapter explores this firstly by exploring the politics of support, arguing that since the 
Thatcher era the Conservatives have become a largely Eurosceptic party, and considering the 
implications of this for the party leadership. It then moves on to consider the politics of power, 
which it is argued will likely have a restraining effect on the politics of support, tempering the form 
of Brexit the Conservatives are able to pursue while in office. Should the party find itself in 
opposition before the Brexit process is completed, however, it is likely to resort to an even harder 
Euroscepticism under a leader committed to an uncompromising Brexit. The conclusion outlines 
several possible scenarios as to what might unfold.  
 
The politics of support  
The politics of support, Gamble (1974: 6) tells us, Ôtakes place in three main arenas Ð Parliament, 
the party organization, and the mass electorateÕ. An aspiring party leader needs to be capable of 
mustering the support of parliamentary colleagues and securing the backing of the party 
membership, before they have the opportunity attempt to win over the public at a general election. 
When David Cameron stood for the party leadership in 2005, he did so in the context of three 
consecutive electoral defeats which the Conservatives had suffered at the hands of Tony BlairÕs 
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Labour. He consequently found a party reasonably receptive to his message that it must Ôchange to 
winÕ. However, mindful perhaps of the rejection of the pro-European Ken Clarke in the leadership 
elections of 1997 and 2001, Cameron realised there were limits to the degree of change that the 
party would be willing to accept, with Europe being the touchstone issue for many of his fellow 
MPs and party members. He therefore sought to burnish his own Eurosceptic credentials by 
promising that, if elected, he would withdraw Conservative MEPs from the European PeopleÕs 
Party grouping in the European Parliament Ð something he eventually did in 2009 (Hayton 2012: 
73). CameronÕs strategy for managing the European question was therefore embedded before he 
even won the party leadership. He sought an accommodation with his partyÕs Euroscepticism, and 
to downplay the salience of the issue, rather than seeking a confrontation with it. As Lynch (2015: 
188) argues, as Leader of the Opposition, ÔCameron approached the EU issue primarily in relation 
to the politics of supportÕ rather than in consideration of the wider politics of power he would come 
to face in government. As such, he continued the trend set by his predecessors (William Hague, Iain 
Duncan Smith and Michael Howard) in offering a Ôharder but quieterÕ stance on European 
integration (Bale 2006: 388).   
 
Given he achieved his primary objective of returning the Conservatives to power after 13 years in 
opposition, we can credit CameronÕs handling of the EU issue prior to the 2010 election with some 
success. Although he did nothing to challenge his partyÕs Eurosceptic orientation, he was able 
reduce the profile of the issue sufficiently so that it did not scupper his wider attempt to detoxify the 
Conservative brand through modernisation (Hayton 2012). It can also be argued that in some ways 
Cameron linked his European policy with modernisation, for example through his call for the EU 
Ôto focus on globalisation, global warming and global povertyÕ (Lynch 2015: 189). Critically in 
terms of the politics of support, the Conservatives appeared relatively united under Cameron, 
This is a pre-publication version of chapter accepted for publication in The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit, 
edited by Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard, and Ben Rosamond; published by Routledge in 2018 (pp. 157-166). 
 
 
 4 
helping re-establish their reputation for governing competence as LabourÕs was hit by the 2008 
crash.  
 
This approach was accordingly carried forward by Cameron into government, where it would have 
far-reaching consequences. The dominance of the politics of support in driving Conservative policy 
towards the EU is critical for understanding the pathway to CameronÕs decision to offer an in-out 
referendum. In the first of GambleÕs arenas, parliament, Cameron had to manage a large group of 
increasingly restive Eurosceptic members of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP), as part of 
his wider efforts to hold together a Coalition with the Liberal Democrats. October 2011 saw the 
largest ever rebellion on the issue of Europe, as 81 Conservative backbenchers flouted a three-line 
whip to support a motion calling for a referendum on EU membership (Cowley et al. 2016: 110). 
This came despite the Coalition legislating in 2011 for a Ôreferendum lockÕ on the ratification of any 
Treaty transferring powers to the EU (Menon and Salter 2016: 1301). A further mutiny over Europe 
saw the government defeated in October 2012, when Labour joined with 53 Conservative rebels in 
support of an amendment calling for the EU budget to be cut (ibid.: 111). In 2013, Ôfaced with what 
would have been an enormous rebellionÕ the government allowed backbenchers a free vote on 
amendment to the QueenÕs Speech voicing regret at the absence of a referendum bill (ibid.: 112). 
The degree of division over the issue was illustrated by CameronÕs extraordinary decision to allow 
Ministers to abstain on the measure, leaving it to Labour and Liberal Democrat votes to ensure the 
motion was defeated. 
 
Analysis of the PCP in the 2010-15 parliament confirms the depth of Eurosceptic feeling it 
contained. Three-quarters of Conservative MPs could be classified as Eurosceptics, with around a 
third of that number identified as ÔhardÕ Eurosceptics favouring withdrawal from the EU (Heppell 
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2013: 345). Cameron also had to contend with widespread Euroscepticism in the second arena: the 
party organization. Here, a 2013 survey of party members found some 70.8 percent favouring 
withdrawal from the EU, although 53.6 percent were willing to back remaining after a renegotiation 
of the terms of membership (Bale and Webb 2016: 126). Eurosceptic sentiment could also be 
identified as a threat to the Conservatives in the third arena of the mass electorate. Under the 
leadership of Nigel Farage the UK Independence Party (UKIP) made significant advances in the 
opinion polls, particularly following the unpopular March 2012 budget (which was labelled an 
ÔomnishamblesÕ). The fact that the Conservatives were in Coalition with the Liberal Democrats 
created political space to their right which UKIP were keen to exploit, and fuelled pressure within 
the Conservative Party for Cameron to try and counter their appeal (Lynch and Whitaker 2016: 
128). This (historically unusual) competition on the right of British politics was illustrated by 
survey data suggesting that more than half of Conservative Party members Ð who it could 
reasonably be assumed would have a high degree of loyalty to the party Ð regarded themselves as 
possible UKIP voters (Webb and Bale 2014: 964). As UKIP support increased throughout the 2010 
parliament, it appeared that this surge was largely at the expense of the Conservatives: estimates by 
pollsters in early 2013 suggested that at least half of UKIPÕs supporters had voted Conservative at 
the previous general election (Webb and Bale 2014: 963). Cameron acknowledged that UKIP and 
intraparty divisions were key factors in his decision to offer an in-out EU referendum (Laws 2016: 
237; Ford and Goodwin 2017: 23). 
 
In the light of the referendum result CameronÕs approach to managing the European issue has been 
widely criticised. Menon and Salter, for example, argue that the UK has historically been quietly 
effective at shaping outcomes at the EU level in ways which suited British interests, but that this 
was hardly ever trumpeted to a domestic audience to make the case for membership: 
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ÒRather than challenging the sceptics in his own party, the Prime Minister had pandered to 
them, to the point of claiming that he would reconsider his support for British membership if 
his renegotiation demands were not met. Small wonder, then, that shifts in the Union that 
suited the UK were hardly mentioned. An awful lot was going to rest on the outcome of the 
renegotiationÓ (Menon and Salter 2016: 1306) 
 
On this reading, CameronÕs strategy of managing the European issue almost exclusively in terms of 
the politics of support was fatally flawed, as although it helped secure an unexpected outright 
victory in the 2015 general election it undermined his ability to make a powerful argument for 
remaining in the EU on principle during the referendum campaign. Rather, by suggesting that he 
would be willing to contemplate leaving the EU if he failed to secure satisfactory renegotiated terms 
of membership he implied that the existing arrangements were unacceptable and should be rejected. 
When the deal he came back with was strikingly similar to the existing terms, his Ôpirouette from 
potential Brexiter to committed campaigner for Remain lacked credibilityÕ (Menon and Salter 2016: 
1308). The journalist Polly Toynbee (2016) commented: ÔCameron enters the ÒinÓ campaign having 
spent his entire decade as party leader undermining support for it. He deserves to lose, but we have 
to hope to God he doesnÕt.Õ The perceived failure of CameronÕs negotiating strategy helps explain 
the fact that 144 Conservative MPs Ð a higher number than had been widely anticipated Ð 
eventually backed the Leave campaign. This number came particularly from the more socially 
conservative wing of the PCP where the most vociferous critics of CameronÕs leadership could be 
found (Heppell et al. 2017).  
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The politics of support continued to dominate Conservative Party activity in the aftermath of the 
referendum result. His credibility in pieces David Cameron immediately resigned, but as he did so 
he stressed that the outcome of the vote Ômust be respectedÕ (Cameron 2016). This set the tone for 
the leadership election that followed, with none of the contenders questioning the wisdom of the 
decision the country had just taken, or suggesting that it might in any way be revisited. This was 
most effectively captured by Theresa May, who although she had sided with Remain during the 
referendum, rapidly declared that ÔBrexit means BrexitÕ (May 2016b). May presented herself as the 
candidate best placed to competently deliver Brexit and to reunify the Conservatives. Her 
overwhelming victory in the ballot of Conservative MPs (Table 1) suggested that she had 
successfully reached out across the ideological divide over Europe, perhaps helped by the fact her 
campaign for the leadership was run by a prominent campaigner for Brexit, Cabinet Minister Chris 
Grayling. However, analysis of the result indicated that although May had eventually attracted the 
support of around a third of the Conservative MPs who had publicly backed the Leave campaign, 
divisions over Europe were still the key determinant of voting behaviour. In the second round of 
voting May attracted the overwhelming support (91%) of MPs who had opposed Brexit, with the 
bulk of the pro-Brexit bloc dividing between the two Brexiteer candidates, Michael Gove and 
Andrea Leadsom (Jeffery et al. 2017).  
 
Table 1: Conservative leadership election: result of parliamentary ballots 
 First ballot Second ballot 
 MPs % MPs % 
May  165  50.2  199  60.5  
Leadsom 66  20.1  84  25.5  
Gove 48  14.6  46  14.0  
Crabb* 34  10.3  -  -  
Fox 16  4.9  -  -  
*withdrew after first ballot voluntarily.  
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Under the partyÕs leadership election rules the top two candidates should have then progressed to a 
ballot of the full party membership, but Leadsom withdrew, recognising that it would be difficult 
for her to lead the PCP having won the support of only a quarter of MPs. This decision was greeted 
with relief by MayÕs supporters, in recognition of the fact that the depth of Eurosceptic feeling 
amongst the wider membership meant that a May victory was far from certain. However, it left the 
new Prime Minister open to the charge that she lacked the legitimacy that a full endorsement from 
her party would have provided, and she faced calls from Labour and the Liberal Democrats for an 
early general election.   
 
May fleshed out her position on Brexit in a speech to the Conservative Party conference in October. 
This again illustrated the extent to which the politics of support continued to drive policymaking in 
this area. Dismissing the notion of a ÔsoftÕ Brexit, the Prime Minister argued that: ÔWe are going to 
be a fully-independent, sovereign country, a country that is no longer part of a political union with 
supranational institutions that can override national parliaments and courtsÕ (May 2016a). She also 
made it clear that the outcome of the Brexit process must involve regaining ÔcontrolÕ over 
immigration, and hailed the first steps in forging new trade deals with countries outside of the EU. 
The speech won warm applause from the conference delegates and placated backbenchers growing 
restless for Article 50 to be triggered Ð something she pledged to do by the end of March 2017. 
However, the stance adopted by May effectively ruled out continued membership of either the 
single market or the customs union before the negotiations had formally begun, significantly 
reducing her room for manoeuvre in the politics of power.  
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The politics of power 
The politics of support and the politics of support are deeply interlinked. Theresa MayÕs basic 
Brexit strategy was to mobilise the politics of support to give her leverage in the politics of power. 
Her sole argument for calling the 2017 general election, and her central contention to the electorate, 
was that the mandate derived from a big election victory would strengthen the UKÕs hand in the 
negotiations with the EU. This approach was blown apart by the election result, which deprived the 
Conservatives of their majority and left the government dependent on a confidence and supply 
agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. MayÕs catastrophic 
miscalculation led rapidly to the reopening of divisions within the Conservative Party and to 
widespread doubts about her capacity to conclude the negotiations successfully. It is likely that we 
will witness the reassertion of the politics of power, and that this will fuel intraparty rifts.   
 
As Gamble (1974: 208) explains, whereas in the political market the key function of political 
parties is the mobilization of electoral support, Ôin the politics of power the function of parties is to 
be an instrument of government, and thereby to reconcile their supporters in the political nation to 
the existing stateÕ. In this formulation, the state is conceived as the site where a consensus is 
reached between economic interests and political forces. Traditionally, the Conservative Party has 
sought to uphold the prevailing politics of power, and then Ôappealed for support on the basis of 
national, not class issues, its capacity to provide national leadership, and its identification with 
national institutionsÕ (ibid.). At times, however, when the established consensus has been deemed 
inadequate to the interests of capital, it has played a leading role in challenging and recasting it. The 
most striking instance of this occurred in the Thatcher era. Brexit is an acutely problematic issue for 
the Conservatives as it brings the politics of support into conflict with the politics of power, but also 
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as the latter is divided over the role of the EU in relation to the UKÕs Anglo-liberal political 
economy and how to respond the referendum outcome.  
 
For the far left who came to advocate ÔLexitÕ, European integration has been a vehicle for 
embedding neo-liberalism and depoliticising economic management through a rules-based system 
elevated above the democratic control of individual nation states (Gifford 2016: 780-2). This 
viewpoint is reinforced by some on the right who advocated membership of the EU on the grounds 
that it not only gave the UK unhindered access to European markets, but substantial influence in 
setting the rules of the game governing them. Arguably successive British governments have 
Ôproved remarkably successfulÕ at shaping European policy frameworks towards their preferences 
(Menon and Salter 2016: 1300). Ironically, given the association of Euroscepticism with 
Thatcherism, the most integrationist measure agreed by any UK government was the Single 
European Act (SEA) signed by Margaret Thatcher in 1986. However, the SEA (which created the 
single market and significantly extended qualified majority voting to enable the harmonisation of 
regulatory standards) played a vital role in embedding an agenda of liberalisation agenda in the EU, 
to the advantage of key sections of British capital, not least the City of London. As Scott Lavery 
(2017: 707) argues, business support for EU membership was premised not just on membership of 
the single market: Ôthe capacity to shape EU legislation was also a crucial strategic considerationÕ. 
The vote for Brexit consequently Ôgenerates a series of dilemmas from the perspective of British 
capitalÕ as the previous strategy of seeking to Ôdefend and extend a liberalising agendaÕ is no longer 
available to business lobbyists (ibid.: 707). 
 
The general election result immediately prompted business groups to call on the government to 
soften its stance on Brexit and to reconsider its position in relation to leaving the single market and 
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the customs union (Savage 2017). Divisions within the Conservative Party were also soon on public 
display, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond (2017) telling the City that the 
government must Ôdo a Brexit deal that puts jobs and prosperity firstÕ and raising the possibility of 
extended transitional arrangements. If the vote to leave the EU could be interpreted as politics 
prevailing over economics (Jensen and Snaith 2016), the election aftermath appeared to signal the 
resurgence of the imperative of political economy. However, identifying the interests of business 
and capital, or rather how these might be best protected outside of the European Union, is not a 
simple task. While a Ôsoft BrexitÕ retaining membership of the single market and the customs union 
would alleviate concerns over market access, it would also leave the UK as a Ôrule takerÕ, 
potentially vulnerable to the encroachment of EU regulation which might undermine British 
interests. Research suggests this would be unacceptable to key business organisations including the 
CBI and representatives of the financial sector (Lavery 2017: 708). Politically, any Brexit deal 
which preserved the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on any long-term or far-
reaching basis in the UK would be fiercely opposed by much of the Conservative Party, even if a 
majority could be found for it in the House of Commons.   
 
Disagreement on the right over the location of core UK economic interests also manifests itself in 
debates over political economy. Chris Gifford (2016: 792) argues that the UK elites have 
Ôconstructed the United Kingdom as a distinctive Eurosceptic political economyÕ in opposition to 
the project of European integration, particularly in response to Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). As a consequence, in the referendum no serious case for European integration was 
advanced. Rather the key divide was Ôbetween those who consider that British power, and its neo-
liberal political economy, is augmented by opposition from within the EU or those who advocate 
complete withdrawalÕ (ibid.: 785). Following the referendum, the debate in terms of the politics of 
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power concerns not only how a ÔsmoothÕ Brexit can be achieved which does not cause a crisis of 
business confidence and an economic downturn, but also how competitive advantage can be 
retained by the UK economy, especially as the EU might seek to restrict the activities of the City of 
London which some regarded as damaging to the Eurozone (Thompson 2017: 439). While some 
Conservatives favour retaining something as close to single market membership as possible 
(essentially a continuation strategy), others envision a Ôglobal BritainÕ carrying the torch for 
economic freedom and striking free trade deals around the world.  
 
The notion of Ôglobal BritainÕ was embraced by Theresa May (2016a) and is a key element of the 
governmentÕs ÔPlan for BritainÕ setting out its objectives for Brexit. Indeed, in the text of the Prime 
MinisterÕs speech launching that plan the phrase ÔGlobal BritainÕ appears eleven times and ÔglobalÕ 
a further half dozen, as May (2017) promised: ÔA country that reaches out to old friends and new 
allies alike. A great, global, trading nation. And one of the firmest advocates for free trade 
anywhere in the world.Õ However, this concept is not a new one in Conservative circles Ð the 
ÔGlobal BritainÕ group, which campaigned for withdrawal from the EU, was founded in 1997 by 
amongst others Lord Pearson (who later left the Conservative Party to join UKIP). The ideology 
behind the Global Britain view is one of hyperglobalist Euroscepticism: Ôthe legacy of the exercise 
of hegemony in the global economy in the 19th century through an Òopen seasÓ policy which 
emphasised free trade and free movement of capital and labourÕ (Baker et al. 2002: 422). From this 
standpoint, European integration is opposed as an essentially protectionist regionalist project, 
placing unwelcome restrictions on neoliberalism both domestically and internationally. The 
globalist view by contrast contains a nostalgic appeal to BritainÕs ÔgreatÕ past, but also links 
strongly to ÔAtlanticismÕ (ibid.). Proponents of Anglo-America and the Anglosphere were 
prominent in the Leave campaign, and continue to be at the forefront of calls for a ÔhardÕ or in some 
This is a pre-publication version of chapter accepted for publication in The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit, 
edited by Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard, and Ben Rosamond; published by Routledge in 2018 (pp. 157-166). 
 
 
 13 
cases even a unilateral Brexit, willing to countenance withdrawal from the EU with no exit deal. 
For some the argument goes beyond free trade and is also a cultural one, in which the English-
speaking world is viewed as sharing essentially the same liberal values. This leads some to endorse 
an integrative political union to rival the EU between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
Ð ÔCANZUKÕ (Lilico 2017).   
 
Encompassing as it does cultural ties, international relations, and a political economy perspective, 
the Anglosphere Ôfurnishes staunch Eurosceptics with a ready-made vision of a post-EU futureÕ 
(Bell 2017). However, there is little to suggest that the idea commands widespread popular support, 
or that the electorate would wish to swap freedom of movement with the EU for a similar 
arrangement with a more far-flung collection of countries in CANZUK. As such, it highlights the 
disjuncture between the Euroscepticism of much of the Conservative Party elite (with its concerns 
about national sovereignty, political economy and trade) and the more populist variant, mobilised in 
the referendum campaign primarily around the issue of immigration. While business organisations 
have generally been supportive of freedom of movement as a feature of the UKÕs flexible labour 
market, controlling immigration was the single biggest driver of the vote for Brexit (Clarke et al. 
2017). Conservative hopes of marginalising UKIP as a significant electoral threat on their right 
flank in the light of Brexit are reliant on a settlement that allows them to claim that they have re-
established ÔcontrolÕ of immigration. However, without a radical improvement in productivity a 
sizable reduction in immigration looks likely to harm UK economic competitiveness and growth. 
The issue of immigration is likely therefore to be the source of a major conflict between the politics 
of support and the politics of power. 
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Conclusion  
As Philip Lynch has argued, ÔFor more than 50 years, European integration has posed significant 
problems for Conservative statecraft in both the politics of support and the politics of powerÕ (2015: 
186). Brexit represents the culmination of a long-standing difficulty for the party, an ideological 
clash that has threatened its unity and plagued successive leaders.  For a brief interlude, following 
the referendum and the election of Theresa May as Conservative Party leader, it appeared as if the 
three-decade-long warfare within the party over Europe might have finally come to an end, with the 
vast bulk of the PCP endorsing her leadership and swinging into line behind her assertion that 
ÔBrexit means BrexitÕ. Following the 2017 general election however, it is difficult to foresee how 
May (or her successor) can navigate a path to Brexit that can command the support of the House of 
Commons while also satiating the demands of the hard-core Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party.  
 
In the politics of support, it is vital to the Conservatives to be seen to deliver on Brexit, as the 
partyÕs electoral fortunes are now heavily dependent on Brexit supporters. Exit polls at the 2017 
election found that 68 percent of those who voted Conservative said they had voted Leave in the 
referendum, whereas 64 percent of Labour voters, and 78 percent of Liberal Democrat voters, had 
voted Remain (Ashcroft 2017). Looking at it the other way, the Conservatives attracted the support 
of some 60 percent of Leavers, but only 25 percent of Remainers. 70 percent of Conservative voters 
were enthusiastic about Brexit, saying they wanted to see it happen Ôas soon as possibleÕ, with just 7 
percent resistant to it. By contrast only a third of Labour voters wanted to get on with Brexit 
swiftly, with 43 percent saying they would still like it prevented if possible. The Conservative 
strategy of targeting the UKIP vote enjoyed considerable success: of those who had voted UKIP in 
2015, some 57 percent backed the Conservatives in 2017, while 18 percent voted Labour and 19 
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percent stuck with UKIP (ibid.). It leaves the electorate polarised however, and the Conservatives 
poorly positioned to reach across the divide to Remain voters.  
 
In the politics of power the Conservatives also face considerable problems, with powerful business 
interests pressing the government to prioritise macro-economic stability and address sectoral 
concerns. Here the government faces competing and at times contradictory demands, whether that 
be prioritising the retention of ÔpassportingÕ rights for the City of London or the availability of 
seasonal migrant labour in agriculture. While the primacy of the UKÕs neoliberal growth model 
remains largely unchallenged in Conservative circles, disagreements exist over how this can be best 
sustained post-Brexit. For some, such as the ÔEconomists for Free TradeÕ campaign group, Brexit is 
an opportunity for a further bout of neoliberalism, re-orientating the UKÕs economy towards global 
free trade Ð quite possibly with unilateral tariff free access to UK market, combined with tax cuts 
and deregulation (Worth 2017).1 Others by contrast want to retain or closely reproduce existing 
trade arrangements with the EU such as the customs union, either for a transitional period or 
indefinitely.  
 
The contingency of political events makes any attempt to foresee the eventual outcome of the Brexit 
process futile. Nonetheless, an appreciation of the politics of the Conservative Party outlined in this 
chapter look set to be crucial to understanding whatever ultimately materialises. While the party 
remains nominally united in the objective of delivering Brexit, there is no settled view as to what 
form it should take or what could be realistically achieved. The emerging conflict between the 
politics of support and the politics of power looks set to pose major difficulties in party 
management terms for the Conservative leadership, and threatens the electoral coalition the party 
mobilised at the 2017 general election. More broadly, the governmentÕs perilous position in the 
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House of Commons, lacking an overall majority, leaves it highly vulnerable to parliamentarian 
rebellions. While the DUP are committed to Brexit and their ten MPs are Ôlikely to prove a solid 
and reliable voting blocÕ the same cannot be said of the Conservative backbenches (Tonge 2017: 
413).  
 
A stark illustration of this came in December 2017, when Theresa May suffered her first 
parliamentary defeat over Brexit. Eleven Conservative MPs backed an amendment tabled by the 
former Attorney General Dominic Grieve to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, asserting 
parliamentÕs right for a Ômeaningful voteÕ on any Brexit deal struck by the government with the EU. 
While the rebels insisted that they were not acting to block the UKÕs withdrawal from the EU, their 
move was widely interpreted as increasing pressure on the government to strike a softer Brexit deal 
which might attract cross-party support. Following this vote, and facing the prospect of another 
parliamentary defeat, the government also backed down on its intention to set in legislative stone 
the UKÕs departure date from the EU, accepting an amendment to the legislation allowing MPs to 
alter it later on. The emergence of this relatively small, but well-organised and determined group of 
rebellious Conservative Remainers provides a new dimension to intra-party divisions over Europe, 
where traditionally it has been the hard-core Eurosceptics who have caused problems for the party 
leadership. If anything, in the early stages of the Brexit process it has been the rebels on the Remain 
side that have caused the government the most problems, rather than the Brexiteers. Even the 
agreement struck with the EU in December 2017 on the terms of the UKÕs departure, which 
included a Ôdivorce billÕ running to some £39bn, and the promise to Ômaintain full alignmentÕ with 
EU internal market rules in the absence of an agreed solution to the Irish border issue, was largely 
welcomed by Conservative Brexiteers. It was instead left largely to Leave campaigners from 
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outside of the Tory party, most vocally Nigel Farage, to condemn the deal as a ÔhumiliationÕ 
(quoted in Daily Telegraph, 8.12.17).  
 
The acquiescence of the Brexiteers within the Conservative Parliamentary Party is strictly 
conditional however, and underpinned in significant part by the fear that should Theresa May fall 
pressure for another general election would rise, possibly paving the way to a Corbyn-led Labour 
government. That could, in turn, lead to sustained pressure for a second referendum, or alternatively 
a form of soft-Brexit which would be unacceptable to Conservative Leavers. MayÕs continued 
tenure in Downing Street is therefore dependent on her carrying forward the Brexit process within 
the broad parameters she set early in her premiership, of leaving the Customs Union and the Single 
Market, and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. As the details of a possible future relationship with the EU 
are negotiated and begin to emerge, the Prime Minister will come under intense pressure from the 
Brexit wing of her party not to compromise overly on those principles. The outcome of the 2017 
general election therefore leaves Theresa MayÕs government seeking to perform an incredibly 
delicate balancing act to ensure the passage of its legislation and deliver Brexit. The behaviour of 
the Labour Party in Parliament is likely to be crucial (see Chapter 14). If Labour seeks alliances 
with Conservative rebels to derail the Brexit process the situation could rapidly become 
unmanageable for the government. In such circumstances, the only option might be to appeal 
directly for a mandate from the people via another referendum or general election, but given recent 
experience the ConservativesÕ enthusiasm for either prospect is likely to be non-existent. Ironically, 
Theresa MayÕs best ally in all of this might yet prove to be Jeremy Corbyn.  
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